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Patent Law Revisionism at the Supreme Court? 
Ted Sichelman* 
The Supreme Court generally may overrule, revise, or disregard its 
precedent.  However, the Court lacks such discretion when Congress 
codifies prior judicial precedent.  Yet, the Court has repeatedly subverted 
Congress’s codification of scienter standards for indirect patent 
infringement.  This Essay describes in detail the Court’s bungled—
essentially revisionist—interpretations of its precedent in Aro Mfg. Co. 
v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. in 1964 and in Global-Tech v. SEB 
in 2011.  Indeed, this Essay suggests that the Court in Global-Tech 
engaged in intentional obfuscation, very likely via a law clerk and 
unbeknownst the Justices.  In the very least, the Justices abdicated their 
responsibility to fully review the applicable cases and legislative history 
in forming the decision. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When Congress passes a statute codifying judicial doctrine, the 
judiciary is expected to read that doctrine with fidelity.  To do otherwise 
would of course subvert the intent of Congress.  However, in the context 
of the appropriate scienter standard for indirect patent infringement, this 
Essay argues that the Court has not once, but twice, engaged in such 
subversion—first in 1964 in Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top 
Replacement Co. (Aro II)1 and again in 2011 in Global-Tech v. SEB.2  
Indeed, this Essay suggests that in Global-Tech, the Court very likely 
engaged in intentional obfuscation of the applicable judicial doctrine in 
order to reach a result it sought on policy grounds.  Although it is unlikely 
that the individual Justices were aware of such obfuscation—rather, it 
was likely the machinations of a law clerk straining to reach the Court’s 
desired outcome in the case—the Justices’ ostensible failure to review the 
relevant case law and legislative history in sufficient detail was a gross 
dereliction of their judicial duties. 
Indirect infringement covers activities that are akin to aiding and 
abetting direct patent infringement.3  Two provisions in the Patent Act of 
1952 codify long-standing patent doctrine deriving from tort law that 
those who aid and abet direct infringement shall be liable for indirect 
infringement.  In the 1952 Patent Act there is a specific provision, section 
271(c), which covers “contributory infringement” for supplying a 
component that is especially adapted for use in a direct infringement.  
Section 271(c) states in relevant part: 
Whoever . . . sells . . . a component of a patented machine, manufacture, 
combination or composition . . . knowing the same to be especially 
made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, 
and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for 
substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory 
infringer.4 
 
1. 377 U.S. 476 (1964). 
2. 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011). 
3. Direct patent infringement arises from the unauthorized making, using, selling, offering to 
sell, importing, and in limited instances, exporting, the entire claimed product, composition of 
matter, or process.  See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), (f), (g) (2012) (defining patent infringement); see also 
Prouty v. Draper, Ruggles & Co., 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 336, 340 (1842) (holding that all elements of a 
patent must be present for direct infringement liability).  
4. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). 
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The 1952 Act also provides for liability for “inducement” of 
infringement in section 271(b), which states that “[w]hoever actively 
induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.”5  
Contributory infringement and inducement of infringement fall under the 
general rubric known as “indirect infringement.”6  Notably, unlike direct 
infringement, which effectively sounds in strict liability, courts have read 
both indirect infringement provisions as including scienter thresholds.  
Specifically, (1) for inducing infringement, courts have required specific 
intent to further the acts of direct infringement and (2) for contributory 
infringement, knowledge that the component sold is especially adapted 
for use in a directly infringing product or process.7 
Yet, each provision is ambiguous as to whether the indirect infringer 
must also have knowledge of the patent-at-issue to be held liable.  Section 
271(c) states that the infringer must “know[] the [component] to be . . . 
especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent.”8  Does that 
mean the accused infringer must only know the component is especially 
adapted for a product that happens to infringe “such patent?”  Or must 
the accused infringer also know of the patent covering the product?  
Section 271(b) states in relevant part “[w]hoever actively induces 
infringement of a patent” shall be liable.9  Does such inducement merely 
require intent to induce acts that happen to infringe?  Or must the accused 
 
5. Id. § 271(b). 
6. Prior to the 1952 Act, many commentators referred to what is now termed “indirect 
infringement” as “contributory infringement.”  However, most commentators today use 
“contributory infringement” to refer to infringing activities under section 271(c) stemming from 
the sale of a component of an infringing product, and “inducing infringement” to refer to general 
aiding and abetting under section 271(b).  These two sections, along with certain exporting 
activities under section 271(f), now constitute the category of “indirect infringement.”  See 35 
U.S.C. § 271(f) (incorporating in substantial part the scienter standards of sections 271(b) and 
271(c)); CHISUM ON PATENTS § 17.04[2] (2010) (discussing indirect infringement); see also Trs. 
of Columbia Univ. v. Roche Diagnostics GMBH, 150 F. Supp. 2d 191, 205 n.36 (D. Mass. 2001) 
(“Prior to the enactment of 35 U.S.C. § 271 (the Patent Act of 1952), there was no statute that 
defined what constituted infringement.  Infringement was divided under the common law into 
‘direct infringement’ (the unauthorized making, using or selling of the patented invention) and 
‘contributory infringement’ (a theory of joint tortfeasance, where an actor, though not technically 
making, using or selling a patented invention, nevertheless displayed sufficient culpability to be 
held liable as an infringer).”); Jones v. Radio Corp. of Am., 131 F. Supp. 82, 83–84 (S.D.N.Y. 
1955) (noting that section 271(b) “includes in its definition of ‘infringer’ a person who does that 
which the courts had previously held to be contributory infringement wherein there was intent to 
infringe, but not necessarily the sale of a component part of a combination patent.  It protects against 
one who aids and abets the direct infringer”).  
7. See CHISUM ON PATENTS § 17.04[2] (2013) (discussing knowledge and intent requirements 
in cases of infringement). 
8. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (emphasis added).  
9. Id. § 271(b). 
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infringer know of the precise patent those acts infringe? 
The issue is one of great importance because numerous potential 
infringers do not have actual knowledge of the patent at the time of suit.10  
As recounted below, in two cases—Aro II and Global-Tech—the Court 
held that knowledge of the patent is required for a showing of indirect 
infringement.  Although the Court held in Global-Tech that “willful 
blindness” could suffice for knowledge, the test is fairly strict and is 
unlikely to capture the vast majority of third parties who might otherwise 
indirectly infringe a patent but for the Court’s knowledge-of-the-patent 
requirement. 
Here, this Essay argues that Aro II and Global-Tech were wrongly 
decided—indeed, examples of patent law “revisionism” in which the 
Court grossly misread, and in Global-Tech arguably obfuscated, the 
historical case law and related legislative history.  As noted earlier, 
Congress stated clearly when it passed the 1952 Act that it was codifying 
the historical scienter standard for indirect infringement.  As described 
below, this historical standard did not require actual knowledge of the 
patent-at-issue.  Rather, opinions from the Supreme Court and lower 
courts from the mid-19th century through the passage of the 1952 Act 
repeatedly held that aiding and abetting direct patent infringement 
required at most specific intent merely to further the acts that constituted 
direct infringement.11  Other than a few lines of aberrant dicta in one case, 
the Supreme Court never required knowledge by the aider and abettor 
that he was assisting in the breach of a legal duty (i.e., infringement of a 
known patent).12  Only one lower court opinion of many held otherwise.13  
As a late 19th century article canvassing the case law succinctly stated: 
“If he intentionally contributed to the act, which the Court holds to be an 
infringement of the patent, he is [an indirect] infringer, and his actual lack 
of knowledge of the existence of the patent will not excuse him.”14  This 
view persisted through the first half of the 20th century and was black-
letter law at the time of the passage of the 1952 Patent Act.15  Given this 
 
10. Cf. Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV. 
1421 (2009) (finding that actual copying of the patent by the accused infringer is infrequent). 
11. See infra notes 32–34 and accompanying text (noting that only a finding of specific intent 
that the items be used with the patented item was required to find liability). 
12. See infra Part I (discussing the historical development of the doctrine of indirect 
infringement). 
13. See infra note 40 and accompanying text (commenting on the aberrant decision in Tubular 
Rivet & Stud Co. v. O’Brien, 93 F. 200 (C.C.D. Mass. 1898)). 
14. Hubert Howson, Contributory Infringement of Patents, ELECTRICAL ENGINEER, Feb. 20, 
1895, at 174, 175, available at http://books.google.com/books?id=UbvmAAAAMAAJ&dq 
=Howson%2C%20contributory%20infringement%20patents&pg=PA174#v=onepage&q=Howso
n,%20contributory%20infringement%20patents&f=false. 
15. Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012). 
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clear historical precedent and Congress’s intent to codify such precedent 
in the 1952 Act, Aro II and Global-Tech can only be read as subversions 
of Congress’s intent. 
Part I of this Essay sets forth the historical background of the role of 
scienter of indirect infringement in patent law, showing that it did not 
include a knowledge-of-the-patent requirement.  Part II begins by 
recounting Congress’s adoption of this historical scienter standard when 
it enacted statutory provisions codifying most of the applicable case law 
in the Patent Act of 1952.  Then, Part II describes the Court’s subsequent 
bungled interpretations of this codified standard in its decisions in Aro II 
and Global-Tech.  Based on this analysis, this Essay suggests that the 
Court in Global-Tech—probably via one of its law clerks and without the 
knowledge of the Justices—engaged in intentional obfuscation of the 
case law, and in the very least, abdicated its responsibility to fully review 
the applicable cases and legislative history in forming its decision.16  This 
Essay concludes with some speculations as to why this apparent result 
transpired.17 
 
16. Nearly all of the recent articles addressing the scienter requirement for indirect infringement 
prior to the Court’s ruling in Global-Tech largely engage in policy-driven analysis to reach their 
proposals, overlooking much of the relevant historical case law and related legislative history in 
their analyses, focusing instead on Supreme Court and Federal Circuit cases mostly bereft of 
pertinent historical discussion.  See, e.g., Timothy R. Holbrook, The Intent Element of Induced 
Infringement, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 399, 408 (2006); Tal Kedem, 
Secondary Liability For Actively Inducing Patent Infringement: Which Intentions Pave The Road?, 
48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1465, 1489–90 (2007); Eric L. Lane, The Federal Circuit’s Inducement 
Conflict Resolution: The Flawed Foundation and Ignored Implications of DSU Medical, 6 J. 
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 198, 202 (2007); Vivian Lei, Is the Doctrine of Inducement 
Dead?, 50 IDEA 875 (2010); Mark A. Lemley, Inducing Patent Infringement, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 225 (2005); Lynda J. Oswald, The Intent Element of “Inducement to Infringe” Under Patent 
Law: Reflections on Grokster, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 225, 231 (2006); Michael 
N. Rader, Toward a Coherent Law of Inducement to Infringe: Why the Federal Circuit Should 
Adopt the Hewlett-Packard Standard for Intent Under § 271(b), 10 FED. CIR. B.J. 299 (2000).  One 
exception is an article by Charles Adams, in which he canvasses much of the historical case law.  
See Charles W. Adams, A Brief History of Indirect Liability for Patent Infringement, 22 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 369 (2006).  Yet, Adams does not parse the language of the 
historical cases carefully, incorrectly concluding that the historical cases contained an “inten[t] to 
cause infringement” requirement, rather than merely intent to cause acts (that happen to infringe).  
Id. at 372–73.  For the reasons presented below, such a view is incorrect.  See infra Part I (discussing 
historical cases holding that knowledge of infringement is not required to prove indirect 
infringement). 
17. Portions of this Essay appeared in an amicus brief I submitted to the Supreme Court in 
Global-Tech as well as an earlier version of this Essay.  See Brief of Law Professors as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Respondent, Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 
(2011) (No. 10-6), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1734376; Ted Sichelman, Minding Patent 
Infringement (San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 11-051, Jan. 17, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1734380.  Since that time, one student note has heavily relied upon my 
arguments to make similar ones, though not in as comprehensive a fashion as made here.  See 
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I.  THE HISTORICAL DOCTRINE OF INDIRECT INFRINGEMENT 
Early cases in the Supreme Court held that the manufacture, sale, or 
use of some—but not all—of the parts of a combination patent does not 
constitute infringement.  For instance, in 1842, the Court held in Prouty 
v. Draper, Ruggles & Co. that “[t]he use of any two of these [three 
patented] parts only . . . is, therefore, not the thing patented.”18  Similarly, 
in 1863, the Court stated in Eames v. Godfrey that if the accused infringer 
“used all the parts but one, and for that substituted another mechanical 
structure substantially different in its construction and operation, but 
serving the same purpose, he was not guilty of an infringement.”19 
In 1871, in Wallace v. Holmes,20 however, a lower court modified the 
default rule by adopting a general doctrine of “indirect” (or as it was 
called until 1952, “contributory”) infringement.21  The patent-in-suit 
concerned an improved lamp, which consisted of a multitude of 
components, including a “glass chimney” and a “burner.”22  The accused 
infringers manufactured and sold the burners, but not the chimneys, and 
argued under the rule of Prouty and Eames that they should not be liable 
for infringement, because they “sold only some of the parts included in 
the patented combination.”23 
Nevertheless, the Wallace court rejected the proffered defense.24  It 
specifically noted that the defendants “have exhibited their burner 
furnished with a chimney, using it in their sales room, to recommend it 
 
Karthik Kumar, Note, Of Deep-Fryers and (Semiconductor) Chips: Why Ignorance of a Patent is 
No Excuse for its Indirect Infringement, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 727 (2012).  An article by Jason Rantanen 
reviews some of the relevant historical case law and provides a brief critique of the reasoning and 
holding in Global-Tech en route to his more general theory of “fault” in patent law, but nothing on 
the order of this Essay.  See Jason Rantanen, An Objective View of Fault in Patent Infringement, 
60 AM. U. L. REV. 1575 (2011).  One practitioner argues mistakenly that the legislative history 
supports the Court’s holdings in Aro II and Global-Tech.  Donna P. Gonzales, Legislative Intent 
Supports a Patent Knowledge Requirement, 40 COLO. LAW. 61 (Nov. 2011).  This article is 
addressed further below.  See infra notes 94, 110. 
18. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 336, 341 (1842). 
19. 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 78, 80 (1863). 
20. 29 F. Cas. 74 (C.C. Conn. 1871) (No. 17,100). 
21. One commentator posits that the use of patent claims, which were not required until 1870, 
see Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 22, 16 Stat. 198, 201 (repealed 1952), led to the need for a 
separate doctrine of indirect infringement.  See Edwin M. Thomas, The Law of Contributory 
Infringement, 21 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 811, 813 (1939) (“There was no great need then for the 
doctrine of contributory infringement but after the act mentioned required the patentee to define, 
by means of claims, the limits of his invention it was soon found that claims often imposed technical 
limitations which made it hard for the patentee to enforce his just rights against wrongdoers.”). 
22. Wallace, 29 F. Cas. at 79. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 79–80. 
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to customers, and prove its superiority, and, therefore, as a means of 
inducing the unlawful use of the complainants’ invention.”25  Drawing 
on principles from the common law of torts, the court found that the 
defendants “have done this for the express purpose of assisting, and 
making profit by assisting, in a gross infringement of the complainants’ 
patent.”26 
The court recognized that, if it did not allow recovery for contributory 
infringement: 
[The patentee] would be driven to the task of searching out the 
individual purchasers for use who actually place the chimney on the 
burner and use it—a consequence which, considering the small value of 
each separate lamp, and the trouble and expense of prosecution, would 
make the complainants helpless and remediless.27 
Although the Wallace court’s test might casually be read to require 
knowledge of the patent, the court held that scienter turned on the “certain 
knowledge that such burners are to be used, as they can only be used, by 
the addition of a chimney.”28  Thus, the Wallace decision—which is the 
progenitor of all indirect infringement opinions and has been cited with 
approval by the Supreme Court29—emphatically did not require any 
knowledge of the patent for a finding of indirect infringement.30 
About a decade after Wallace v. Holmes, in American Cotton-Tie Co. 
v. Simmons,31 the Supreme Court relied on two lower court opinions that 
implemented the Wallace rule to find that the sale of a component used 
in an infringing combination constituted infringement when “the 
defendants prepare and sell the [component] . . . intending to have it 
 
25. Id. at 80. 
26. Id. (“In such case, all are tort-feasors, engaged in a common purpose to infringe the patent, 
and actually, by their concerted action, producing that result.”). 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 179–80 (1980) (“The idea that 
a patentee should be able to obtain relief against those whose acts facilitate infringement by others 
has been part of our law since Wallace v. Holmes . . . .”); Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany 
Perforated Wrapping Paper Co., 152 U.S. 425, 433 (1894) (“There are doubtless many cases to the 
effect that the manufacture and sale of a single element of a combination, with intent that it shall 
be united to the other elements, and so complete the combination, is an infringement.” (citing 
Wallace)).  
30. See Odin B. Roberts, Contributory Infringement of Patent Rights, 12 HARV. L. REV. 35, 37 
(1898) (“The act was found to be wrongful because of the obvious intent of the defendants to make 
the burner for use only with another thing which the user was to supply.”); cf. Dawson Chemical, 
448 U.S. at 188 (“Yet the court [in Wallace] held that there had been ‘palpable interference’ with 
the patentee’s legal rights, because purchasers would be certain to complete the combination, and 
hence the infringement, by adding the glass chimney.”). 
31. 106 U.S. 89 (1894). 
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used . . . to produce the results set forth in the [asserted] patents.”32  
Importantly, consistent with the common law of torts, the Supreme Court 
merely required specific intent on the part of the alleged infringer that the 
component be used in the combination that happened to be infringing, 
but not that the alleged indirect infringer know of the patent covering the 
combination.33  
Specifically, regarding the sale of a tie (the unpatented component) for 
use in baled cotton (the patented product), the Court found: 
They [i.e., the accused infringers] sell the tie having the capacity of use 
in the manner described, and intended to be so used.  Only the bale of 
cotton and the press are needed to produce the result set forth in the 
specifications of the patents, and without the bale of cotton and the press 
the tie would not be made or sold.  The slot through the end-bar of the 
buckle in the Cook patent is of no practical use apart from the band and 
the bale of cotton . . . and, although a person who merely makes and 
sells the buckle or link in each case may be liable for infringing those 
patents, he is so liable only as he is regarded as doing what he does with 
the purpose of having the buckle or link combined with a band and used 
to bale cotton.34 
In other words, in American Cotton-Tie, the Supreme Court merely 
focused on the indirect infringers’ specific intent with respect to the direct 
infringer’s acts, rather than knowledge of the patent-at-issue. 
In 1894, in Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Perforated Wrapping 
Paper Co.,35 the Supreme Court cited Wallace v. Holmes and other 
cases36 for the proposition that “the manufacture and sale of a single 
 
32. Id. at 95.  The Court cited Saxe v. Hammond, 21 F. Cas. 593 (C.C. Mass. 1875) (No. 12,411) 
and Bowker v. Dows, 3 F. Cas. 1070 (C.C. Mass. 1878) (No. 1,734), both of which in turn cited 
Wallace v. Holmes.  In citing Wallace, the Saxe and Bowker courts reaffirmed that specific intent 
with respect to the direct infringer’s acts—not knowledge of the patent-in-suit—was of central 
concern.  See Bowker, 3 F. Cas. at 1071 (“Where the patent was for a combination of the burner 
and chimney of a lamp, and the defendant made and sold the burner intending that it should be used 
with the chimney, he was held by Judge Woodruff to be liable as an infringer.”); Saxe, 21 F. Cas. 
at 594 (“Different parties may all infringe, by respectively making or selling . . . one of the elements 
of a patented combination, provided those separate elements are made for the purpose, and with the 
intent, of their being combined by a party having no right to combine them.”).   
33. American Cotton-Tie, 106 U.S. at 95. 
34. Id. at 94–95 (emphasis added); see also id. at 95 (“Because the defendants prepare and sell 
the arrow tie, composed of the buckle or link and the band, intending to have it used to bale cotton 
and to produce the results set forth in the Cook and the McComb patents, they infringe those 
patents.” (emphasis added)). 
35. 152 U.S. 425 (1894). 
36. Oddly, Morgan Envelope did not cite the Court’s earlier opinion in American Cotton-Tie, 
which led the Court in Dawson Chemical to mistakenly note “[t]he doctrine of contributory 
infringement was first addressed by this Court in Morgan Envelope.”  Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm 
& Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 189 (1980) (citation omitted).   
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element of a combination, with intent that it shall be united to the other 
elements, and so complete the combination, is an infringement.”37  
Importantly, the Supreme Court again held that specific intent as to the 
direct infringer’s act to combine the component with other elements so 
as to create a combination (that happened to be patented) was the relevant 
scienter inquiry—and not whether the alleged contributory infringer 
knew it was aiding infringement per se, i.e., had knowledge of the patent-
in-suit.38 
In the following years, numerous lower court cases cited to the holding 
of Wallace v. Holmes as well as to the Supreme Court’s adoption of the 
Wallace rule in American Cotton-Tie and Morgan Envelope.39  Nearly all 
of these lower court cases adhered to the established rule that the scienter 
required for indirect infringement is specific intent with respect to the 
direct infringer’s acts, but not knowledge of the patent-at-issue.40 
 
37. Morgan Envelope, 152 U.S. at 433. 
38. The Court ultimately held in Morgan Envelope that contributory infringement did not apply 
“where the element made by the alleged infringer is an article of manufacture perishable in its 
nature.”  Id. 
39. See, e.g., Renwick v. Pond, 20 F. 536, 540 (C.C.N.Y. 1872) (citing Wallace); Saxe v. 
Hammond, 21 F. 593, 594 (C.C. Mass. 1875) (citing Prouty v. Ruggles, Byam v. Farr, Foster v. 
Moore, and Eames v. Godfrey); Rumford Chem. Works v. Hecker, 20 F. Cas. 1342, 1346 (C.C.N.J. 
1876) (No. 12,134) (citing Wallace and Renwick v. Pond); Richardson v. Noyes, 20 F. Cas. 723, 
724 (C.C. Mass. 1876) (No. 11,792) (“[T[his makes them in law infringers, if their standards, when 
combined with the carriages in the mode in which they are designed to be combined, infringe the 
patent.”); Bowker v. Dows, 3 F. 1070, 1071 (C.C. Mass. 1878) (citing Wallace); Holly v. Mach. 
Co., 4 F. 74, 79 (C.C. Vt. 1880) (citing Wallace); Boyd v. Cherry, 50 F. 279, 282 (C.C. Iowa 1883) 
(citing Wallace); Travers v. Beyer, 26 F. 450, 450 (C.C.N.Y. 1886) (citing Wallace); Alabastine 
Co. v. Payne, 27 F. 559, 560 (C.C.N.Y. 1886) (citing Wallace and American Cotton-Tie); Snyder 
v. Bunnell, 29 F. 47, 48 (C.C.N.Y. 1886) (citing Wallace and American Cotton-Tie); Celluloid Mfg. 
Co. v. Am. Zylonite Co., 30 F. 437, 439–40 (C.C.N.Y. 1887) (noting the defendant “has become, 
to the extent to which it employs the [patented] improvement, an infringer”); Heaton Peninsular 
Button Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288, 297 (6th Cir. 1896) (citing Wallace, 
American Cotton-Tie, and Morgan Envelope); Shickle, Harrison & Howard Iron Co. v. St. Louis 
Car-Coupler Co., 77 F. 739, 743 (8th Cir. 1896) (citing Wallace and American Cotton-Tie); 
Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Kelsey Elec. Ry. Specialty Co., 75 F. 1005, 1007 (2d Cir. 1896) 
(citing Wallace and American Cotton-Tie); Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co. 
(Thomson-Houston II), 80 F. 712, 721 (6th Cir. 1897) (citing Wallace, American Cotton-Tie, and 
Morgan Envelope); Red Jacket Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 82 F. 432, 439 (7th Cir. 1897) (citing Wallace); 
Am. Graphophone Co. v. Leeds, 87 F. 873, 878 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1898) (finding liability where “[t]he 
design of the defendants’ machine, and their intent in selling it, are to have it used in connection 
with the engraved sound record of the complainant”); Loew Filter Co. v. German Am. Filter Co., 
107 F. 949, 950 (6th Cir. 1901) (citing Heaton Peninsular Button Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty 
Co., Edison Electric Light Co. v. Peninsular Light, and Thomson-Houston); Canda v. Mich. 
Malleable Iron Co., 124 F. 486, 489 (6th Cir. 1903) (citing Heaton and Edison); James Heekin Co. 
v. Baker, 138 F. 63, 66 (8th Cir. 1905) (Van Devanter, Circuit Judge) (citing Heaton and Edison).  
40. See supra note 39 (citing cases).  The only exception appears to be Tubular Rivet & Stud 
Co. v. O’Brien, which misread several earlier opinions to incorrectly find “that a necessary 
condition of the defendant’s guilt is his knowledge of the complainant’s patent.”  93 F. 200, 202–
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In this regard, the Thomson-Houston line of cases is of particular note.  
In 1896, in Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Kelsey Elec. Railway Specialty 
Co. (Thomson-Houston I),41 the court quoted Wallace v. Holmes and a 
number of other post-Wallace cases for the proposition that the sale of 
components “which are useful only for the purpose of performing 
functions involved in the operation of the patent . . . raises a presumption 
that [the accused infringers] intend their [components] should be so 
used.”42  And like Wallace v. Holmes, while the language used in 
Thomson-Houston I—e.g., “the intentional aiding of one person by 
another in the unlawful making or selling or using of the patented 
invention”43—could be indiscriminately interpreted to require 
knowledge of the patent for a finding of contributory infringement, a 
careful reading shows that such knowledge was not at issue in that case 
nor in the ones it cites.44 
The author of an article briefly cited in Thomson-Houston I (and later 
cited in Global-Tech)45 reviewing many of the 19th century cases 
confirmed that intent as to the direct infringer’s acts, not knowledge of 
the patent-in-suit, was the relevant concern in making the scienter 
standard of contributory infringement: 
The principle [of contributory infringement] requires an intention on the 
part of the defendant to participate in the act which constitutes the 
infringement.  By this it is not meant that the party must have known of 
the patent and intended to infringe it.  If he intentionally contributed to 
the act, which the Court holds to be an infringement of the patent, he is 
an infringer, and his actual lack of knowledge of the patent will not 
excuse him.  The publication of patents is assumed in law to be 
sufficient notice to the public of their existence.46 
Similarly, one of the leading patent law treatises of the late 19th 
century stated, “To make or sell a single element, with the intent that it 
shall be united to the other elements, and so complete the combination, is 
infringement.”47 
In Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co. (Thomson-Houston 
 
05 (C.C.D. Mass. 1898).  
41. 72 F. 1016 (C.C. Conn. 1896). 
42. Id. at 1018. 
43. Id. at 1017 (quoting Howson, supra note 14, at 174). 
44. See id. at 1017–19 (discussing the scienter required to prove intent to infringe). 
 45. See infra notes 145–47. 
46. Howson, supra note 14, at 175 (emphasis added). 
47. 3 WILLIAM CALLYHAN ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS 101 
(Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1890). 
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II),48 the majority opinion—written by then-Sixth Circuit Judge William 
Howard Taft—arrived at the same conclusion as Thomson-Houston I 
regarding the appropriate scienter standard: 
[W]here one makes and sells one element of a combination covered by 
a patent with the intention and for the purpose of bringing about its use 
in such a combination he is guilty of contributory infringement and is 
equally liable to the patentee with him who in fact organizes the 
complete combination.49 
Judge Taft also remarked, “An infringement of a patent is a tort 
analogous to trespass . . . .  From the earliest times, all who take part in a 
trespass, either by actual participation therein or by aiding and abetting 
it, have been held to be jointly and severally liable for the injury 
inflicted.”50  In this regard, the standard common law rule in tort for 
specific intent is that the aider and abettor must intend to encourage the 
acts of the direct tortfeasor, but need not know that the direct tortfeasor’s 
acts are unlawful.51 
In 1907, in Cortelyou v. Johnson & Co.,52 the Supreme Court briefly 
addressed a claim of indirect infringement and a separate claim for 
inducement of breach of contract for the sale of ink for use with a patented 
machine, the “Neostyle,” which by the terms of its sale was to be used 
with the seller’s ink.53  In dismissing the claims, the Court wrote: 
True, the defendant filled a few orders for ink to be used on a rotary 
Neostyle, but it does not appear that it ever solicited an order for ink to 
be so used, that it was ever notified by the plaintiffs of the rights which 
they claimed, or that anything which it did was considered by them an 
infringement upon those rights.  Further, none of the chief executive 
officers of the company had knowledge of the special character of the 
rotary Neostyle machine or the restrictions on the purchase of 
supplies.54 
Some commentators have read the Court’s argument regarding 
 
48. 80 F. 712 (6th Cir. 1897). 
49. Id. at 721 (emphasis added). 
50. Id. 
51. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 876(a) (1939) (“For harm resulting to a third person 
from the tortious conduct of another, a person is liable if he . . . orders or induces such conduct, 
knowing of the conditions under which the act is done or intending the consequences which ensue 
. . . .”); see also id. § 876(b) (indicating that although knowledge of the legal duty may be sufficient 
to meet the scienter requirement, it is not the sole way to do so). 
52. 207 U.S. 196 (1907). 
53. See id. at 198–99 (explaining that the machine was sold subject to a license displayed on the 
machine that required that paper, ink, and all other supplies used with the machine be made by the 
Neostyle Company and that defendant company sold its ink to the owners of the Neostyle machine). 
54. Id. at 200.  
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notification “by the plaintiffs of the [patent] rights” as requiring 
knowledge of the patent for indirect infringement.55  However, this 
interpretation is unsubstantiated.  First, the accused infringers in 
Cortelyou had no “knowledge of the special character of the rotary 
Neostyle machine,” which is the essential scienter element for indirect 
infringement.56  In this regard, if the patentee had put the accused 
infringers on direct notice of the patent, they would have had such 
knowledge.  Thus, while knowledge of the patent may be sufficient to 
meet the scienter requirement, it is not necessary.57  Second, knowledge 
of the patent would be relevant for a finding of inducement of breach of 
contract, as the contract included a license of the patent.  Because the 
Court did not separately address each claim in the quoted passage, it 
could have simply been referring to the contract claim in its discussion of 
“the [patent] rights.”58  Thus, Cortelyou should not be read as implicitly 
endorsing any sort of knowledge-of-the-patent requirement, particularly 
given the Court’s express statements otherwise in American Cotton-Tie 
and Morgan Envelope. 
In 1909, in Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Mach. Co.,59 the 
Supreme Court found Leeds liable for contributory infringement for 
selling a component of Victor’s patented invention to Victor’s customers 
(namely, a record for use in Victor’s patented machine).  Although the 
Court only briefly remarked upon the scienter requirements for 
contributory infringement, its discussion in no manner deviated from 
earlier doctrine that knowledge of the patent is not an element of this 
requirement.60 
The Supreme Court next addressed the rule in Henry v. A.B. Dick Co. 
 
55. See, e.g., Brief for Business Software Alliance as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 
18, Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011) (No. 10-6), 2010 WL 
4973150, at *17 (“[T]here must be proof that the defendant ‘actually knew [of] the existence of the 
complainant’s patent.’” (citing Tubular Rivet & Stud Co. v. O’Brien, 93 F. 200, 202–05 (C.C.D. 
Mass. 1898)); Brief for Comcast Corp. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 14, Global-
Tech, 131 S. Ct. 2060 (No. 10-6), 2010 WL 4973147, at *14 (“Congress required actual knowledge 
of infringement as an element of liability . . . .”).  
 56. Cortelyou, 207 U.S. at 200. 
57. Cf. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1939) (stating that knowledge of the legal 
duty binding the direct tortfeasor is sufficient, but not necessary, for a finding of scienter on the 
part of the indirect tortfeasor). 
 58. Cortelyou, 207 U.S. at 199–200. 
59. 213 U.S. 325 (1909). 
60. See id. at 332–34 (discussing knowledge and intent with respect to the end-use of Leeds’ 
records in the patented machines, but never considering whether Leeds had knowledge of the 
patent-at-issue); id. at 337 (“Petitioner was found guilty of selling records which constituted an 
element in the combination of the patent in suit, and for that petitioner was punished.”). 
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in 1912.61  Contrary to its prior holdings, the Court stated in A.B. Dick 
without citation that “if the defendants [accused of contributory 
infringement] knew of the patent and that [the direct infringer] had 
unlawfully made the patented article . . . with the intent and purpose that 
[the direct infringer] should use the infringing article . . . they would assist 
in her infringing use.”62  This is the only statement by the Supreme 
Court—or any lower court cited with approval by the Court—that actual 
knowledge of the patent is a pre-requisite to a finding of indirect 
infringement.  However, in A.B. Dick, knowledge of the patent was not 
in dispute, and the Court provided no analysis to support its contention 
that actual knowledge was relevant.  Indeed, the Court went on to cite 
Thomson-Houston I, which as noted earlier, did not require actual 
knowledge of the patent to support a finding of indirect infringement.63  
Rather, the A.B. Dick court appeared to misread the use of the phrase 
“patented invention” in Thomson-Houston I as requiring knowledge of 
the patent.64  Thus, the statement in A.B. Dick should be viewed as one 
line of aberrant and unsupported dicta in a sea of otherwise consistent 
holdings from the Supreme Court.  Indeed, in the years following A.B. 
Dick, lower courts continued to hold that knowledge of the patent was not 
a requirement for indirect infringement (and it does not appear that any 
court followed the mistaken dicta in A.B. Dick).65 
 
61. 224 U.S. 1 (1912), overruled on other grounds by Motion Picture Patent Co. v. Universal 
Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).  Just one year earlier, the Court briefly addressed contributory 
infringement in the context of copyright law.  See Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 63 
(1911) (citing Morgan-Envelope Co. v. Albany Perforated Wrapping Paper Co., 152 U.S. 425, 433 
(1894), with approval). 
62. A.B. Dick, 224 U.S. at 33 (emphasis added). 
63. The Court also approvingly cited a number of other cases in A.B. Dick, none of which 
adopted a knowledge-of-the-patent requirement.  See id. at 33–34 (citing Wallace v. Holmes, 
Risdon Iron & Locomotive Works v. Trent, Thomson-Houston II, and American Graphophone Co. 
v. Hawthorne). 
64. See id. at 33 (quoting Thomson-Houston I, 72 F. 1016, 1017 (C.C. Conn. 1896)).  Kumar 
offers an alternative interpretation—mainly that the Court merely set forth a sufficient, but not a 
necessary, condition for scienter in A.B. Dick.  Kumar, supra note 17, at 738–39.  In his view, 
“[b]ecause a finding of knowledge automatically implies the defendant’s intent to cause the acts 
that subsequently constitute infringement, this finding satisfies the requirement set forth in 
Wallace.”  Id. at 738.  Such a view is certainly consistent with the law of torts, see supra note 51 
and accompanying text, and is perhaps the only way to reconcile the Court’s citation in A.B. Dick 
of Wallace and other cases, but it seems the Court would have stated the broader rule, rather than 
merely a sufficient condition for meeting the scienter standard.  In any event, whether the statement 
is mistaken dicta or merely the recitation of a narrow sufficient condition, it clearly does not instate 
any sort of binding knowledge-of-the-patent requirement. 
65. See, e.g., N.Y. Scaffolding Co. v. Whitney, 224 F. 452, 459 (8th Cir. 1915) (hoisting devices 
and frames); Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co. v. Gould Coupler Co., 229 F. 429, 443–44 
(W.D.N.Y. 1916) (electric car-lighting systems); Individual Drinking Cup Co. v. Errett, 300 F. 955, 
960 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) (Learned Hand, J.) (beverage dispenser); Wilson v. Union Tool Co., 265 F. 
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Following A.B. Dick, in a line of cases culminating in 1944 with 
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co.,66 the Supreme Court greatly 
narrowed the applicability of indirect infringement.  Specifically, it held 
that the sale of unpatented material cannot constitute indirect 
infringement, even “where the unpatented material or device is itself an 
integral part of the structure embodying the patent,” because to allow as 
much would run afoul of the antitrust laws.67  This ruling essentially left 
indirect infringement a dead letter. 
II. SCIENTER FOR INDIRECT INFRINGEMENT AFTER THE PATENT ACT OF 
1952 
In response to the Court’s decision in Mercoid, Congress decided in 
the Patent Act of 1952 to reinstate the law of indirect infringement by 
codifying precedent as it existed prior to Mercoid.68  This Part begins by 
discussing that codification and shows that Congress did not intend to 
deviate from the historical practice that knowledge of the patent was not 
required.69  Then, this Part explains how the Court bungled its reading of 
 
669, 672 (9th Cir. 1920) (underreamers); Individual Drinking Cup Co. v. Errett, 297 F. 733, 734–
35 (2d Cir. 1924) (beverage dispenser); Lenk v. Hunt-Lasher Co., 14 F.2d 335, 337 (D. Mass. 1926) 
(automatic blow torches); Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Precise Mfg. Corp., 11 F.2d 209, 210 
(2d Cir. 1926) (transformers); Electro Bleaching Gas Co. v. Paradon Eng’g Co., 12 F.2d 511, 513 
(2d Cir. 1926) (water sterilization process); Bassick Mfg. Co. v. Ready Auto Supply Co., 22 F.2d 
331, 341 (E.D.N.Y. 1927) (lubricating apparatus); Nat’l Brake & Elec. Co. v. Christensen, 38 F.2d 
721, 723 (7th Cir. 1930) (repair parts); Trico Prods. Corp. v. Apco-Mossberg Corp., 45 F.2d 594, 
599 (1st Cir. 1930) (windshield wipers); Am. Voting Mach. Corp. v. City of N.Y., 2 F. Supp. 191, 
192 (S.D.N.Y. 1933) (voting machine); Chas. H. Lilly Co. v. I.F. Laucks, Inc., 68 F.2d 175, 189 
(9th Cir. 1933) (adhesive product); Autographic Register Co. v. Sturgis Register Co., 110 F.2d 883, 
885 (6th Cir. 1940) (paper feed device).  See generally 3 A. DELLER, WALKER ON PATENTS 1764–
65 (1937) (citing cases).   
66. 320 U.S. 661 (1944).  Previous cases addressing the issue include Motion Picture Patents 
Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917), Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 
283 U.S. 27 (1931), Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938), and B.B. Chem. Co. v. 
Ellis, 314 U.S. 495 (1942).   
67. Mercoid, 320 U.S. at 665.  Concurring, Justice Black noted that contributory infringement 
had no statutory basis, and argued that “[i]nstead, the chief reliance [of Justice Frankfurter’s dissent 
in favor of the doctrine] appears to be upon the law of torts, a quotation from a decision of a lower 
federal court which held that no infringement was shown, and the writer’s personal views on 
‘morals’ and ‘ethics’”—all reflections of the common law lineage of the doctrine.  Id. at 673 (Black, 
J., concurring). 
68. See generally Hymen Diamond, The Status of Combination Patents Owned by Sellers of an 
Element of the Combination, 21 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 843, 849–50 (1939) (discussing the case law 
prior to Mercoid); see also Giles S. Rich, Contributory Infringement, 14 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 376 
(1932) (same). 
69. See infra Part II.A; see also Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 813 (1989) 
(“When Congress codifies a judicially defined concept, it is presumed, absent an express statement 
to the contrary, that Congress intended to adopt the interpretation placed on that concept by the 
courts.”). 
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this precedent, not just once, but twice, in Aro II and Global-Tech, so as 
to instate a completely opposite doctrine.70 
A. The Legislative History of the 1952 Act Demonstrates Congress 
Intended No Change in Scienter Standards from Pre-1952 Doctrine 
The Patent Act of 1952 codified the historical precedents in sections 
271(b) and 271(c), other than the Court’s holdings in the series of 
opinions culminating in Mercoid, so as to effectively overrule them.71  
Specifically, Congress intended section 271(c) to codify those cases 
relating to the sale of a component of an infringing combination and 
section 271(b) to codify those cases relating to general aiding and 
abetting of direct infringement.72 
The legislative history of the 1952 Act does not in any manner show 
intent by Congress to impose a “knowledge of the patent” requirement 
onto sections 271(b) or 271(c).  Although the legislative history notes that 
indirect infringement “has been applied to enjoin those who sought to 
 
70. See infra Part II.B–C. 
71. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2012) (explaining why a patent owner entitled to relief for 
infringement shall not be otherwise deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of a patent by 
enforcing patent rights for contributory infringement); Dawson Chem. v. Rohm and Haas Co., 448 
U.S. 176, 198–212 (1980) (recounting the effort to resurrect the doctrine of contributory 
infringement in the Patent Act of 1952); S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 8, 28 (1952) (stating this 
amendment was meant to “eliminate the doubt and confusion” created by “a number of decisions 
of the courts in recent years”); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 9 (1952) (same); see also Charles W. 
Adams, supra note 16, at 384–89 (same); Note, Section 271(b) of The Patent Act of 1952: 
Confusion Codified, 66 YALE L.J. 132, 139 (1956) (same).  With respect to the misuse issue, 
Representative Rogers aptly summed up Congress’s intent: 
Then in effect this recodification, particularly as to section 231 [which became § 271 in 
the Patent Code of 1952], would point out to the court, at least that it was the sense of 
Congress that we remove this question of confusion as to whether contributory 
infringement existed at all, and state in positive law that there is such a thing as 
contributory infringement, or at least it be the sense of Congress by the enactment of this 
law that if you have in the Mercoid case [320 U.S. 661, 680, 64 S.Ct. 268, 278, 88 L.Ed. 
376] done away with contributory infringement, then we reinstate it as a matter of 
substantive law of the United States and that you shall hereafter in a proper case 
recognize or hold liable one who has contributed to the infringement of a patent. 
Hearings before Subcommittee No. 3 of House Judiciary Committee on H.R. 3760, 82d Cong. 159 
(1951) (Testimony of Representative Rogers), quoted in Aro II, 377 U.S. 476, 485 n.6 (1964) 
(alterations in original).   
72. See Aro II, 377 U.S. at 485 n.6 (“[S]ection [271(c)] was designed to ‘codify in statutory 
form principles of contributory infringement’ which had been ‘part of our law for about 80 years.”); 
S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 22 (“One who actively induces infringement as by aiding and abetting the 
same is liable as an infringer . . . .”); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 9 (“[O]ne who aids and abets an 
infringement is likewise an infringer . . . .”); CHISUM ON PATENTS § 17.04[2] (2010) (“[The] 
legislative history indicates that the two sections were intended as complementary provisions, 
together codifying the basic principles of contributory infringement developed by the courts before 
1952.”).   
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cause infringement by supplying someone else with the means and 
directions for infringing a patent,”73 this language is no less ambiguous 
than that of section 271(b) (“actively induces infringement”).  Indeed, the 
legislative history goes on to note that “[p]aragraph (b) recites in broad 
terms that one who aids and abets an infringement is likewise an 
infringer.”74 
This and other portions of the legislative history confirm the 
understanding that sections 271(b) and 271(c) codified the historical 
precedent, which—relying on the same principles as the common law of 
torts—did not require any knowledge of the legal duty (i.e., patent) at 
issue, but merely required specific intent to encourage the direct 
infringer’s acts.75  Perhaps the most convincing evidence of Congress’s 
intent is the testimony of Giles Rich—then a practicing attorney who 
played a key role in drafting the 1952 Act, and later Chief Judge of the 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Federal Circuit.76  In his 
words, “‘knowingly sells a component of a patented machine’ means to 
us that you know that the component is going into that machine.  You 
don’t have to know that it is patented.”77  In sum, in adopting sections 
271(b) and 271(c), there is no indication whatsoever that Congress 
desired to deviate from the pre-1952 scienter standard that knowledge of 
the patent was not required for a finding of indirect infringement. 
B.  Revisionism Part I in Aro II 
As discussed at length in Part I—other than one line of aberrant 
dicta78—prior to the 1952 Act, knowledge of the patent was consistently 
held by the Supreme Court not to be a prerequisite for a finding of 
contributory infringement.  However, a little over a decade later in Aro 
Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. (Aro II),79 the Supreme 
Court held otherwise in a 5–4 decision regarding the 1952 Act’s 
codification of contributory infringement in section 271(c).80  The 
 
73. S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 6 (emphasis added). 
74. Id. (emphasis added). 
75. See id. at 22 (“One who actively induces infringement as by aiding and abetting the same is 
liable as an infringer”).  
76. See Adams, supra note 16, at 387 n.65 (“Judge Rich’s insights with respect to 35 U.S.C. § 
271 are especially significant because of his prominent role in its enactment.”). 
77. See infra notes 95–96 and accompanying text (further quoting Rich’s congressional 
testimony).  Although Judge Rich was referring to a version of the statute that was later amended, 
as explained below, the amendment had no material effect on his interpretation. 
 78. See supra notes 61–65 and accompanying text (explaining that, prior to 1952, contributory 
infringement did not require actual knowledge of the patent at issue). 
79. 377 U.S. 476 (1964). 
80. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas, Clark, and White held this view.  Justices 
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remainder of this Section recounts the holding and reasoning of the 
majority opinion, explaining its faults in detail, particularly in the context 
of the arguments lodged by the dissenting Justices. 
First, it is important to recognize that all of the Justices agreed that: 
In enacting § 271(c), Congress clearly succeeded in its objective of 
codifying this case law.  The language of the section fits perfectly Aro’s 
activity of selling “a component of a patented * * * combination * * *, 
constituting a material part of the invention, * * * especially made or 
especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent and not a 
staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial 
noninfringing use.”  Indeed, this is the almost unique case in which the 
component was hardly suitable for any noninfringing use.  On this basis 
both the District Court originally, and the Court of Appeals in the 
instant case, held that Aro was a contributory infringer within the 
precise letter of § 271(c).81 
Thus, the Justices seemingly agreed that section 271(c) succeeded in 
codifying the pre-1952 elements for contributory infringement, which as 
explained above, contained no knowledge-of-the-patent requirement 
under any legitimate reading of the case law.82  Indeed, in a footnote, the 
Court appeared to acknowledge as much, stating “Aro’s factory manager 
admitted that the fabric replacements in question not only were specially 
designed for the Ford convertibles but would not, to his knowledge, fit 
the top-structures of any other cars.”83  This factual finding, upon which 
the district and circuit courts based their holdings, had no relationship 
whatsoever to whether Aro knew of the patent-at-issue. 
Nonetheless, the majority effectively questioned whether Congress 
actually intended to codify pre-1952 case law: 
However, the language of § 271(c) presents a question, apparently not 
noticed by the parties or the courts below, concerning the element of 
knowledge that must be brought home to Aro before liability can be 
imposed.  It is only sale of a component of a patented combination 
“knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use 
 
Harlan, Brennan, Stewart, and Goldberg dissented on the issue.  Id. at 482 n.8.  Notably, Justices 
Black and Douglas had previously voted in Mercoid to effectively eliminate the doctrine of indirect 
infringement.  See Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 661–62, 672 (1944).  
Indeed, Justice Douglas wrote the opinion of the majority and Justice Black wrote a concurring 
opinion.  See id.  None of the other Justices on the Aro II Court were on the Mercoid Court.  See 
Justices of the United States Supreme Court, THE GREEN PAPERS, http://www.thegreenpapers.com 
/Hx/JusticesUSSC.html (last visited July 7, 2013) (listing all Justices of the United States Supreme 
Court by term). 
81. Aro II, 377 U.S. at 487–88 (ellipses in original) (footnotes and citations omitted).  
82. See supra Part I. 
83. Aro II, 377 U.S. at 487–88 n.7. 
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in an infringement of such patent” that is contributory infringement 
under the statute.  Was Aro “knowing” within the statutory meaning 
because—as it admits, and as the lower courts found—it knew that its 
replacement fabrics were especially designed for use in the 1952–1954 
Ford convertible tops and were not suitable for other use?  Or does the 
statute require a further showing that Aro knew that the tops were 
patented, and knew also that Ford was not licensed under the patent so 
that any fabric replacement by a Ford car owner constituted 
infringement?84 
Thus, the majority read the specific language of section 271(c) as 
posing a question not present in the pre-1952 case law (which is almost 
certainly why neither the parties nor the lower courts recognized it): 
whether knowledge of the patent is a (new) requirement imposed by 
Congress in the 1952 Act for contributory infringement arising from the 
sale of a component especially adapted for use in an infringing product 
under section 271(c).  
In holding that Congress did intend to impose such a requirement, the 
majority essentially relied on the opinion of Justice Black,85 who voted a 
few decades earlier in Mercoid to jettison the entire doctrine of indirect 
infringement because it had no statutory basis.86  Justice Black reasoned 
that: 
Usually the word “knowing” means “knowing,” and I am unwilling to 
say that in § 271(c) it means “unknowing.”  This statute to me means 
rather plainly that in order to violate it, one who sells an article must 
know that the article is to be used “in an infringement of such patent” 
and that it is “especially made or especially adapted” for that purpose.87 
Justice Black also argued that the legislative history supported his 
view.  Specifically, he noted that section 271(c) had originally been 
drafted as follows: 
Whoever knowingly sells a component of a patented * * * combination * 
* * especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of 
such patent * * * shall be liable as a contributory infringer.88 
Congress ultimately adopted the following language: 
 
84. Id. at 488 (emphasis added). 
85. See id. at 488 n.8 (identifying the way each member of the Court voted and summarizing 
the opinion of the dissenters).  Although the majority also stated that it relied on the concurring 
opinion of Justice White, since the only reasons he explicitly provided, see id. at 514 (White, J., 
concurring), were duplicative of Justice Black’s much more detailed opinion, see id. at 528–29 
(Black, J., dissenting from the judgment but commanding a majority on the scienter issue), only 
Justice Black’s opinion is addressed here. 
86. See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text. 
87. Aro II, 377 U.S. at 525. 
88. Id. (emphasis added) (citing H.R. 3760, 82d Cong., § 231(c) (1951)). 
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Whoever sells . . . a component of a patented . . . combination . . . , 
knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use 
in an infringement of such patent . . . shall be liable as a contributory 
infringer.89 
Justice Black interpreted the change as requiring knowledge that the 
component would be used for an infringing activity—that is, knowledge 
of the patent and its contents.  He based his finding on several arguments, 
none of which is convincing.  First, Justice Black noted that the original 
position of the word “knowingly” led some commentators to argue that 
“it was not clear exactly how much a person had to be shown to have 
known before he could be held liable as a contributory infringer.”90  
Relying on congressional testimony, Justice Black concluded that 
Congress adopted the recommendation of some of those testifying that a 
contributory infringer must “know of the existence of [the] patent.”91 
Justice Black’s conclusion, however, is supported by neither the 
testimony nor the legislative history.  Contrary to Justice Black’s view, 
there are three potential interpretations of the original language: (1) the 
seller need only know that it is making a sale, but need not know of the 
sale’s end use or know of the patent-at-issue; (2) the seller must know it 
is making a sale and know of its end use, but need not know of the patent; 
and (3) the seller must know of all three elements.  Justice Black, on the 
other hand, wrongly assumed that the original language could only mean 
either interpretation (1) or (3). 
Thus, in moving “knowing,” Congress could—as a mere matter of 
statutory interpretation—have intended interpretation (2), which does not 
require knowledge of the patent.  Indeed, in addition to historical practice 
and the legislative history, the testimony relied upon by Justice Black 
actually supports this interpretation.92  As Justice Black himself remarked 
 
89. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (1952) (emphasis added). 
90. Aro II, 377 U.S. at 525 (citing Patent Law Codification and Revision: Hearings on H.R. 
3760 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong. 215 (1951)). 
91. Id. at 526. 
92. See generally Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm and Hass Co., 448 U.S. 176, 204 (1980) (noting 
that the Court “regard[s] each set of hearings as relevant to a full understanding of the final 
legislative product” encompassing sections 271(a)–(d) of the Patent Act of 1952).  Relatedly, 
Justice Black also argued that the statement in the legislative history that “[t]his latter paragraph 
[of section 271(c)] is much more restricted than many proponents of contributory infringement 
believe should be the case,” supported his interpretation.  Aro II, 377 U.S. at 527.  This statement 
can be rebutted on at least two grounds.  First, adoption of interpretation (2) (above) is also 
consistent with the legislative history to the extent it also restricts one of the interpretations of the 
original language.  See H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 9 (1952) (clarifying that section 271 declares 
what constitutes infringement, codifies in statutory form the principles of contributory 
infringement, and eliminates doubt and confusion); S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 8 (1952) (same).  And 
while Judge Giles Rich expressed a view consistent with interpretation (2) prior to the amendment, 
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in a footnote regarding an exchange in a Congressional hearing prior to 
the amendment: 
When a witness from the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department 
raised the same objection, the following exchange took place: 
‘(Congressman) BRYSON. It seems to me that if he sells it at all he 
knows he sells it. 
‘Mr. FUGATE (of the Justice Department). He knows he sells it; but, 
as in this case that I mentioned, the cutter of the metal plate according 
to a special pattern didn’t know that it was to be used in an infringing 
manner, that it was to be used in a patented combination. 
‘(Congressman) ROGERS. Inasmuch as you recognize that the law still 
gives a cause of action against the contributor who helps infringe, would 
there be any objection on the part of the Justice Department to clarify 
that law in definite words so that there would not be the confusion that 
the gentlemen have testified to?’93 
Although the Justice Department representative used the phrases 
“infringing manner” and “patented combination” in his testimony, he 
arguably meant “manner that happens to infringe” and “combination that 
happens to be patented”—rather than knowledge of the patent—because 
Representative Rogers began with the question concerning knowledge of 
the sale itself, as contrasted with knowledge of the end use of the sale.  
Thus, Justice Black ostensibly made an interpretative mistake in viewing 
this exchange as supporting his broad interpretation of “knowingly” in 
the statute.94 
 
see infra notes 95–96 and accompanying text, others—such as Representative Bryson—expressed 
a view that the pre-amendment language could simply imply interpretation (1).  Second, the above 
statement cited by Justice Black may have nothing to do with scienter standards, but instead a 
compromise regarding other aspects of section 271(c).  For example, in Dawson Chemical, the 
Court noted: 
[Giles] Rich warned against going too far [with the contributory infringement provision].  
He took the position that a law designed to reinstate the broad contributory infringement 
reasoning of Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912), “would kill itself in time.”  The 
proposed legislation, however, “stopped short of that” and “said that you can control 
only things like the switches in the Mercoid case, which are especially made or adapted 
for use in connection with such patent and which are not suitable for actual, commercial, 
noninfringing use.”  
Dawson Chemical, 448 U.S. at 208 (citations omitted). 
93. Aro II, 377 U.S. at 526 n.10; see also Patent Law Codification and Revision: Hearings on 
H.R. 3760 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong. 175 (1951) 
(statement of Rep. Crumpacker) (objecting to the original language because “the way it is phrased 
the word ‘knowingly’ refers directly to the word ‘sells’”).   
94. Gonzales makes essentially the same set of interpretative errors as Justice Black in her recent 
article arguing that the legislative history supports a knowledge-of-the-patent requirement.  See 
Gonzales, supra note 17, at 62–66 (comparing the 1948 original proposed language against the 
language used in the current version of section 271 and mistakenly arguing that Congress’s intent 
when it enacted section 271 was to protect the interest of commerce, requiring it to narrow the 
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Further evidence of Justice Black’s interpretative error is provided by 
Judge Giles S. Rich—then a practicing patent lawyer, who was one of the 
primary drafters of the Patent Act of 1952.  In his testimony prior to the 
amendment, Judge Rich interpreted the provision as follows: 
‘[K]nowingly sells a component of a patented machine’ means to us 
that you know that the component is going into that machine.  You don’t 
have to know that it is patented.  You don’t have to know the number 
of the patent, and you don’t have to know that the machine that it is 
going into constitutes an infringement.  You just know its ultimate 
destination.’95 
Judge Rich testified similarly later in the hearing: 
‘Mr. Fugate. I would like to know whether Mr. Rich is construing 
“knowingly” as meaning that the supplier knows that it is to be used in 
an infringing manner. 
‘Mr. Rogers. And constitutes a material part of the patent. 
‘Mr. Fugate. Yes, that is the point. 
‘Mr. Rich. I have already explained that he knows how it is to be used.  
He doesn’t have to know about the patent, he doesn’t have to be legally 
advised of that infringement.’96 
Thus, based on the testimony of Giles Rich, arguably the most 
appropriate interpretation is that “knowingly” was moved within section 
271(c) simply to clarify that this modifier referred to the knowledge that 
the component was “especially adapted” rather than knowledge that a sale 
itself was being made.97 
Second, Justice Black argued that “[i]t is hard to believe that Congress 
intended to hold persons liable for acts which they had no reason to 
suspect were unlawful.”98  Yet, this argument could just as easily apply 
 
original proposed language so that only those who had knowledge of the patent would be found 
liable under section 271). 
95. Aro II, 377 U.S. at 526 n.11.  
96. Patent Law Codification and Revision: Hearings on H.R. 3760 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong. 175–76 (1951); see also Freedman v. Friedman, 242 
F.2d 364, 367 (4th Cir. 1957) (reviewing the same legislative history and concluding “[t]here is no 
indication of any intent to make knowledge that there was a patent and that it was being infringed 
necessary to liability for contributory infringement”).   
97. Notably, Judge Rich authored the Federal Circuit’s opinion in Hewlett-Packard v. Bausch 
& Lomb, which held that knowledge of the patent was not necessary for a finding of induced 
infringement.  See Hewlett-Packard v. Bausch & Lomb, 909 F.2d 1464, 1468–70 (Fed. Cir. 1990).  
Unfortunately, although that opinion contains some discussion of the relevant historical case law, 
it does not canvass the cases or legislative history in a comprehensive manner, much less discuss 
Judge Rich’s role in the drafting the 1952 Act and his contemporaneous views of the relevant 
statutory language.  See id.  
98. Aro II, 377 U.S. at 527. 
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to direct infringement, which effectively sounds in strict liability,99 
relying upon a theory of constructive notice from the publication of 
patents.100  Although Justice Black argued that “one who sells an 
unpatented and unpatentable” product without actual knowledge of the 
patent should not be held liable,101 he overlooked that contributory 
infringement, as historically applied, merely required knowledge that the 
infringing component was especially adapted for use in the very 
combination that happened to infringe the patent-at-issue.  Because 
Congress meant to codify pre-1952 law, Justice Black was simply 
incorrect when it came to surmising Congress’s intent regarding 
knowledge of the patent. 
Third, Justice Black argued that 35 U.S.C. § 287, which states that “no 
damages shall be recovered by the patentee in any action for 
infringement, except on proof that the infringer was notified of the 
infringement and continued to infringe thereafter,” precludes damages in 
the absence of knowledge of the patent.102  Yet, as the dissenters rightly 
noted, section 287 is merely relevant to marking and provides a defense 
to any accused infringer against pre-suit damages in the event the 
patentee did not properly mark its products.103  Section 287 does not 
impose a blanket “actual notice” requirement to recover damages.104  
Critically, section 287 has never been read—before or after Aro II—to 
eliminate all liability for patent infringement for lack of actual notice.105  
Rather, regardless of notice, infringers are always potentially liable for 
 
99. To be certain, Justice Black did argue that section 287 imposed a knowledge-of-the-patent 
requirement for direct infringement, at least for “innocent consumers of patented products.”  Id. at 
529.  For the reasons presented below, such an argument was meritless.  See infra notes 102–05 
and accompanying text. 
100. See Sontag Chain Stores Co. v. Nat’l Nut Co., 310 U.S. 281, 295 (1940) (finding that 
publication of a patent provides “implied knowledge of the . . . patent”); Howson, supra note 14, 
at 174–75 (“The publication of patents is assumed in law to be sufficient notice to the public of 
their existence.”).  
101. Aro II, 377 U.S. at 527–29. 
102. See id. at 527–28 (arguing it would be “hard to believe that Congress intended to hold 
persons liable for acts which they had no reason to suspect were unlawful”). 
103. See Wine Ry. Appliance Co. v. Enter. Ry. Equip. Co., 297 U.S. 387, 395 (1936) (noting 
that marking provides notice of a patent to others). 
104. See id. at 398 (“[T]he act of 1861 did not require a patentee who did not produce to give 
actual notice to an infringer before damages could be recovered; and there is nothing in the language 
or history of the act of 1870 sufficient to indicate an intent to alter his position in this regard.”).  
105. See Aro II, 377 U.S. at 488 n.8 (majority opinion on the judgment but dissenting on the 
scienter issue) (citing DELLER, supra note 65, § 453) (“To constitute an infringement of a patent, it 
is not necessary that the infringer should have known of the existence of the patent at the time he 
infringed it or, knowing of its existence, it is not necessary that he should have known his doings 
to constitute an infringement.”); see also Sontag Chain Stores, 310 U.S. at 295 (finding that patent 
publication provides constructive notice). 
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post-suit damages and the possibility of injunctive relief.  Yet, in Aro II, 
Justice Black completely misread the provision as precluding not just pre-
suit damages, but all forms of liability in the absence of knowledge of the 
patent.106  Thus, section 287 cannot support a knowledge-of-the-patent 
requirement. 
Last, Justice Black argued on policy grounds that without a 
knowledge-of-the-patent requirement, there would be a “tremendous 
burden” placed on “bona fide dealers in or purchasers of unpatented 
products.”107  Specifically, Justice Black indicated that because the 
number of patents covering products—for instance, automobiles—is very 
large, searching to determine if a particular patent was infringed would 
be needlessly costly and difficult.108  Although these arguments may have 
some merit,109 obviously they cannot override the intent of Congress to 
codify prior case law.110  Indeed, although Justice Black pegged his 
interpretation of section 271(c) on Congress’s purported attempt to 
modify the common law by moving the term “knowing,” he failed to 
reconcile his misguided view in any manner with Congress’s clear aim in 
the legislative history to codify prior case law. 
The four Justices dissenting from Justice Black’s views made 
arguments consistent with the text of the statute, historical practice, and 
the legislative history in finding that all “Congress meant to require was 
simply knowledge that the component was especially designed for use in 
a combination and was not a staple article suitable for substantial other 
use, and not knowledge that the combination was either patented or 
 
106. Aro II, 377 U.S. at 528–29 (Black, J., dissenting from the judgment).  
107. Id. at 529. 
108. See id.  
109. The aim of this Essay is not to discuss the policy rationales in favor or against the outcomes 
in Aro II and Global-Tech, as they should have played no role in the outcome of the case given the 
clear intent of Congress to codify historical precedent.  For a discussion of the various policy 
rationales animating the Court’s opinions, see Sichelman, supra note 17.   
110. See Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 407 (2006) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (“[W]e have an overriding duty to obey statutory commands that unambiguously 
express the intent of Congress . . . .”).  Gonzales argues that Congress evidenced its intent to 
generally protect industry in the legislative history, which—along with the statutory amendments 
discussed above—should be viewed as congressional intent to adopt a knowledge-of-the-patent 
requirement.  See Gonzales, supra note 17, at 61 (noting the argument made by Angier L. Goodwin, 
a member of the subcommittee, who stated he wanted the legislation to avoid requiring every 
business to be “on notice” that every move it made could be an infringement).  Yet, vague 
statements evincing support for industry certainly cannot override Congress’s clear intent to codify 
statutory case law.  Indeed, whether a knowledge-of-the-patent requirement hurts or helps industry 
is a contentious policy question.  See supra note 16 (citing numerous conflicting scholarly 
approaches).  
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infringing.”111  They made four arguments in support of this conclusion.  
First, the dissenters noted that to hold otherwise would contravene 
Congress’s intention “to codify the case law of contributory infringement 
as it existed” historically.112  These Justices properly recognized that 
“[u]nder that case law, liability was established by a showing that the 
component was suitable for no substantial use other than in the patented 
combination,” that is, in the combination that happened to be patented, 
regardless of the infringer’s knowledge of the patent.113  Second, as 
argued earlier,114 these Justices found that the 
[c]hange in the language of the bill concerning the knowledge 
requirement . . . was intended merely to assure that the statute would be 
construed to require knowledge that the article sold was a component 
of some combination and was especially designed for use therein, rather 
than simply knowledge that the article was being sold.115 
The Justices further noted that “none of the Congressmen said anything 
to indicate agreement with these views [that knowledge of the patent 
should be required] or disagreement with the contrary view expressed by 
the spokesman for the sponsors of the bill.”116  Third, they explained that 
Justice Black’s argument that no infringement—direct or indirect—could 
be found absent knowledge of the patent contradicted the plain language 
of section 271(a) governing direct infringement.117  Moreover, such a 
view contravened pre-1952 black-letter doctrine that direct infringement 
is a strict liability offense.118  Fourth, these Justices rightly rebutted 
Justice Black’s contention that section 287  
regarding marking and notice mandated a knowledge-of-the-patent 
requirement.119  Specifically, they argued, section 287  
prevents a patentee from recovering damages for infringement unless 
he has marked the patented article with notice of the patent.  Since a 
 
111. Aro II, 377 U.S. at 488 n.8 (majority opinion on the judgment).   
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. See supra notes 92–94 and accompanying text. 
115. Aro II, 377 U.S. at 488 n.8.  
116. Id. 
117. See id. (“The suggestion that a person cannot be liable even for direct infringement when 
he has no knowledge of the patent or the infringement is clearly refuted by the words of section 
271(a).”).  
118. See DELLER, supra note 65, § 453 (“To constitute an infringement of a patent, it is not 
necessary that the infringer should have known of the existence of the patent at the time he 
infringed it or, knowing of its existence, it is not necessary that he should have known his doings 
to constitute an infringement.”). 
119. See Aro II, 377 U.S. at 488 n.8 (“Since a patentee may hardly be expected to make the 
article when it has not been manufactured or sold by him but rather by an infringer, the section has 
been held not to apply to such a situation.”). 
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patentee may hardly be expected to make the article when it has not 
been manufactured or sold by him, but rather by an infringer, the section 
has been held not to apply to such a situation.120 
For the reasons stated by the four dissenting Justices, as well as the 
arguments presented earlier, the majority’s holding in Aro II is clearly 
incorrect under any reading of the law.  Ultimately, Justice Black’s and 
the majority’s legal arguments were meritless, indeed so meritless that 
they can rightfully be termed “revisionist.”  Granted, Justice Black’s 
policy argument grounded on the difficulty of searching for relevant 
patents may have some force, but it cannot of course override the intent 
of Congress to codify prior precedent.121 
C.  Revisionism Part II in Global-Tech v. SEB 
In 2011, in Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., in an opinion 
written by Justice Alito, the Supreme Court continued to misread the 
1952 Act by unanimously holding that under section 271(b), inducement 
of infringement requires actual knowledge that the inducing acts 
constitute patent infringement—or, alternatively, no less than “willful 
blindness” thereof.122  The facts of the case are instructive for 
understanding the Supreme Court’s analysis. 
The plaintiff, a French company, SEB S.A. (“SEB”), held a patent to a 
“cool touch” deep fryer that was sold under the popular “T-Fal” brand in 
the United States.123  Because SEB’s deep fryer was cooler externally 
than competing fryers, and thus safer and easier for home use, it enjoyed 
commercial success.124  A U.S. competitor, Sunbeam, desired to 
manufacture and sell a “cool touch” fryer, and it contacted a Hong-Kong 
company, Pentalpha, to develop one.125  Pentalpha then purchased an 
SEB fryer in Hong Kong and, for all but cosmetic features, used it to 
construct a deep fryer for Sunbeam.126  The Hong Kong SEB fryer did 
not display any U.S. patent markings.127 
Pentalpha then hired a patent attorney to conduct a freedom-to-operate 
 
120. Id. 
121. In another article, I also find Justice Black’s policy arguments ultimately unconvincing, 
mainly because there is scant reliable empirical evidence to support his claims.  See Sichelman, 
supra note 109. 
122. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068 (2011).  Justice Kennedy 
filed a dissent based on other grounds.  See id. at 2072 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that willful 
blindness should not suffice for knowledge). 
123. Id. at 2064 (majority opinion). 
124. See id. 
125. Id. 
126. See id. 
127. See id. 
SICHELMAN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/6/2013  12:47 PM 
332 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  45 
analysis to determine whether the fryer was infringing any U.S. 
patents.128  However, Pentalpha did not inform the patent attorney that it 
had developed the fryer’s design directly from its study of SEB’s fryer.129  
The attorney never discovered SEB’s patent and ultimately issued an 
opinion letter advising Pentalpha that it was able to manufacture its deep 
fryer without infringing any identified U.S. patents.130  Pentalpha began 
selling its deep fryer to Sunbeam in 1997, causing SEB to lose market 
share and sales.131  In March 1998, SEB sued Sunbeam for patent 
infringement.132  Despite the lawsuit, Pentalpha continued to sell its 
fryers to other customers.133  SEB and Sunbeam settled their lawsuit, and 
SEB went on to sue Pentalpha for direct infringement under section 
271(a) and induced infringement under section 271(b).134 
The ensuing jury trial found for SEB under both section 271(a) for 
direct infringement and section 271(b) for indirect infringement.135  
Pentalpha appealed to the Federal Circuit on both findings.136  For 
complex procedural reasons related to the jury instructions, the Federal 
Circuit found that it was necessary to affirm both on the direct and 
inducement claims for Pentalpha to be held liable for infringement.137  
Ultimately, the Federal Circuit affirmed on both grounds, holding in 
relevant part that induced infringement under section 271(b) requires that 
(1) the alleged infringer knew or should have known that its actions 
would induce actual infringement of a patent and (2) the alleged infringer 
had knowledge of such patent.138  Although there was no evidence on 
record that Pentalpha actually knew of SEB’s patent before April 1998, 
the Federal Circuit found adequate evidence that “Pentalpha deliberately 
disregarded a known risk that SEB had a protective patent.”139  
According to the Federal Circuit, this deliberate disregard amounted to a 
form of “actual knowledge.”140  Upon Pentalpha’s petition, the Supreme 
 
128. See id. 
129. See id. 
130. See id. 
131. See id. 
132. See id. 
133. See id. 
134. See id. 
135. See id. 
136. Id. 
137. See SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (stating 
the jury verdict form “reveal[ed] a hopeless ambiguity,” such that the court could not determine 
which elements were crucial to the jury’s decision). 
138. Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2064–65. 
139. Id. at 2065 (citing SEB, 594 F.3d at 1377). 
140. Id. 
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Court granted certiorari.141 
The Court began its analysis with the text of section 271(b): “Whoever 
actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an 
infringer.”142  As in Aro II, regarding section 271(c), the Court in Global-
Tech found the language of section 271(b) “ambiguous”: 
In referring to a party that “induces infringement,” this provision may 
require merely that the inducer lead another to engage in conduct that 
happens to amount to infringement, i.e., the making, using, offering to 
sell, selling, or importing of a patented invention. . . . On the other hand, 
the reference to a party that “induces infringement” may also be read to 
mean that inducer must persuade another to engage in conduct that the 
inducer knows is infringement.  Both readings are possible.143 
Because the statutory language was ambiguous, the Court then 
examined the case law in effect prior to the enactment of the 1952 Act, 
properly recognizing that “section [271(b)] was designed to codify in 
statutory form principles of contributory infringement which had been 
part of our law for about [eighty] years.”144 
1.  The Court’s Arguably Obfuscatory Analysis of the Pre-1952 Case 
Law 
Although the Court’s reasoning through this point in its opinion was 
flawless, it would soon take a sharp turn in the opposite direction.  The 
first major flaw was the Court’s quite mistaken view that the pre-1952 
case law was “less clear than one might hope . . . provid[ing] conflicting 
signals regarding the intent needed in such cases.”145  The Court began 
its review of the case law by recounting the opinion of then-Judge Taft in 
Thomson-Houston II that it was “sufficient if the seller of the component 
part intended that the part be used in an invention that happened to 
infringe a patent.”146  In a corresponding footnote, the Court cited the 
contemporaneous scholarly article by Howson mentioned earlier that 
summarized the case law as clearly not requiring knowledge of the 
patent-at-issue to meet the scienter requirement for indirect 
infringement.147 
The Court included in the same footnote a list of “other authorities 
 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
144. Id. at 2066 (quoting Aro II, 377 U.S. 476, 485–86 (1964) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, 
at 9 (1952))) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
145. Id. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 2066 n.3 (citing Howson, supra note 14, at 9).  
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from this era [that] likewise suggest” the same rule, oddly including its 
holding in Morgan Envelope.148  Recall that in this case the Court 
remarked that knowledge of the patent is not an essential element of 
scienter for indirect infringement, stating “that the manufacture and sale 
of a single element of a combination, with the intent that it shall be united 
to the other elements, and so complete the combination, is an 
infringement.”149  What is particularly striking about the Court’s 
relegation of its own precedent to a footnote is that immediately after its 
discussion in the text of then-Judge Taft’s holding in Thomson-Houston 
II that knowledge of the patent was not required, the Court described its 
apparently contrary statement in Henry v. A.B. Dick without noting that 
it was pure dicta.150  The Court then explained that its description in 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.151 of pre-1952 
contributory infringement cases was in accord with the view of A.B. 
Dick.152  In a corresponding footnote, the Court found that its opinion in 
Cortelyou “contains language that may be read as adopting a similar 
position,” pointing to language in the case that “may suggest that it was 
necessary to show that the defendants had notice of [the plaintiff’s] patent 
rights.”153  Following this description, the Court cited the singular lower 
court holding, Tubular Rivet, that required knowledge of the patent for a 
finding of indirect infringement.154  Based on this analysis, the Court 
concluded that “the pre-1952 case law that [section 271(b)] was meant to 
codify [is] susceptible to conflicting interpretations.”155 
 
148. Id. 
149. Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Perforated Wrapping Paper Co., 152 U.S. 425, 433 
(1894).  The Court in Global-Tech also cited several other lower court cases and the treatises by 
Deller and Robinson as suggesting the same rule.  See Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2066 n.3 (citing 
Individual Drinking Cup Co. v. Errett, 297 F. 733, 739–40 (2d Cir. 1924); N.Y. Scaffolding Co. v. 
Whitney, 224 F. 452, 459 (8th Cir. 1915); DELLER, supra note 65, § 507 (same); 3 W. ROBINSON, 
THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 924 (1890) (same); Howson, supra note 14).  
150. See id. at 2066.  Specifically, the Court failed to indicate that the following statement in 
A.B. Dick was merely dicta:  
[I]f the defendants [who were accused of contributory infringement] knew of the patent 
and that [the direct infringer] had unlawfully made the patented article . . . with the intent 
and purpose that [the direct infringer] should use the infringing article . . . they would 
assist in her infringing use.   
Id.    
151. 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
152. Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2067. 
153. Id. at 2066 n.4 (citing Cortelyou v. Johnson & Co., 207 U.S. 196, 200 (1907)). 
154. See id. at 2067 n.4 (citing Tubular Rivet & Stud Co. v. O’Brien, 93 F. 200, 203 (C.C.D. 
Mass. 1898) (“[A] necessary condition of the defendant’s guilt is his knowledge of the 
complainant’s patent.”)). 
155. Id. 
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As Part II shows, the Court’s recounting of pre-1952 case law is sorely 
mistaken and arguably obfuscatory.  First, the Court completely ignored 
its early holding in American Cotton-Tie that knowledge of the patent is 
not required for indirect infringement.156  There is simply no mention of 
this opinion anywhere in Global-Tech.  Although the Court did cite its 
subsequent, similar holding in Morgan Envelope, it did so only in a 
footnote without any discussion.  So when the Court cited its contrary 
statement in A.B. Dick in the text of Global-Tech, it made it appear that 
there was no contrary Supreme Court precedent.  Second, the Court failed 
to note that its statement in A.B. Dick was pure dicta.157  Moreover, 
although the Court noted that its similar statement in Grokster was 
dicta,158 it failed to mention that this statement was premised on no 
analysis whatsoever, but rather citations to inconclusive statements in 
Federal Circuit and lower court opinions that did not carefully examine 
the historical doctrine regarding the appropriate level of scienter for 
indirect infringement.159 
Thus, if the Court had explicitly discussed its prior on point holdings 
in American Cotton-Tie and Morgan Envelope, it would have been 
apparent that its dictum in A.B. Dick was of no import in its analysis of 
the pre-1952 case law.  Similarly, the Court strained to find that its 
decision in Cortelyou “may suggest” that knowledge of the patent was 
required in the pre-1952 case law.160  As the Court subtly indicated, but 
failed to state explicitly, as discussed earlier, there was an alternative 
explanation of the relevant language in Cortelyou.161  Finally, its citation 
of Tubular Rivet is similarly misplaced—and misleading—because the 
Court failed to mention that this opinion was a singular aberration among 
a sea of contrary lower court holdings.  Indeed, the Tubular Rivet court 
premised its statement on a misreading of earlier cases,162 including 
Thomson-Houston II—the opinion written by then-Judge Taft that the 
 
156. See supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text (explaining in detail that the Court in 
American Cotton-Tie did not require knowledge of the patent for a finding of indirect 
infringement). 
157. Moreover, as Kumar contends, the Court in any event arguably misread A.B. Dick as stating 
a necessary—rather than, merely sufficient—requirement for indirect infringement.  See Kumar, 
supra note 17, at 738–39. 
158. Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2066–67. 
159. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936 (2005) (citing 
Federal Circuit and lower court opinions that provided little to no review of the relevant historical 
case law regarding scienter for indirect infringement). 
160. Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2066 n.4. 
161. See supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text. 
162. See Tubular Rivet & Stud Co. v. O’Brien, 93 F. 200, 203 (C.C.D. Mass. 1898) (“All the 
cases above cited assert or imply . . . . ”) (discussing Thomson-Houston II earlier in the opinion).  
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Court had explained just a few pages earlier squarely held otherwise.163 
Taken together, at best, the Court’s analysis is deeply flawed, and at 
worst, is pure revisionism—namely, an intentional attempt to obfuscate 
the pre-1952 case law.  It appears very likely that at least a law clerk 
engaged in intentional obfuscation of the pre-1952 case law.  First, 
whatever clerk likely drafted the opinion was presumably well-aware of 
the analysis presented above in Part I, as I submitted it in similar form in 
an amicus brief in the case.164  Although many amicus briefs are routinely 
ignored, mine was the only one to recount the full pre-1952 case law 
history, including citations to then-contemporaneous legal scholarship, 
some of which was quite obscure, such as the Howson reference.165  
Because the Court’s description of the pre-1952 case law closely tracks 
that in my brief, including citations to Howson and other references, it 
seems likely that at least a law clerk partially relied on the brief in drafting 
the opinion.  If so, the law clerk very likely would have been cognizant 
of the analysis in Part I. 
Second, the errors of omission committed in the Court’s description 
are egregious.  They include completely ignoring the Court’s first major 
holding on the topic, relegating another holding to a footnote, suggesting 
that contrary dicta was a square holding, citing dicta from a recent 
opinion that contained no analysis, contending that a single line from a 
case “suggested” a contrary holding when there was clearly an alternative 
explanation casting serious doubt on such a view, and citing the one 
aberrant lower court opinion on the issue without discussing the 
numerous opinions holding otherwise. 
It seems very likely that these mistakes were not unintentional, at least 
at the law clerk level.  Apparently, sometime after oral argument, the 
Court decided on its approach primarily for policy reasons, as neither the 
parties’ briefs nor the Federal Circuit’s relevant opinions addressed the 
historical case law in any sufficient detail, seemingly leaving a blank slate 
upon which the Court could pen any possible outcome.  Whatever the 
reason, after the case was assigned to Justice Alito, presumably he 
delegated responsibility to a law clerk to draft the opinion consonant with 
the Court’s desired outcome—namely, to adopt a knowledge-of-the-
patent requirement tempered by the doctrine of willful blindness.  Given 
 
163. Id. at 202–04. 
164. See Brief of Law Professors, supra note 17 (describing in detail the case law preceding the 
1952 Patent Act).  
165. See generally Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotus 
blog.com/case-files/cases/global-tech-appliances-inc-v-seb-s-a/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2013) (prov-
iding for download all of the filed briefs). 
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the astonishing nature of the mistakes made by the Court, it seems 
doubtful that any of the Justices read the pre-1952 cases in detail.  In the 
very least—regardless of whether the Court engaged in intentional 
obfuscation through one of Justice Alito’s clerks—the opinion represents 
a significant abdication of the Court’s implicit judicial duties to fully 
review the relevant case law when forming a decision.166 
2.  Further Failure to Fully Review Aro II 
The Court’s bungling of the case law continued in its subsequent 
analysis, which turned to Aro II for guidance given the “conflicting 
interpretations” of the pre-1952 case law.167  Like in Aro II,168 the Court 
began on the right foot by noting the linguistic ambiguity of the language 
of section 271(c).169  As the Court properly recognized: 
The phrase “knowing [a component] to be especially made or especially 
adapted for use in an infringement” may be read to mean that a violator 
must know that the component is “especially adapted for use” in a 
product that happens to infringe a patent.  Or the phrase may be read to 
require, in addition, knowledge of the patent’s existence.170 
The Court then noted the 5–4 split in Aro II, very briefly recounting 
the reasoning of the majority and dissent.171  Without any explicit analysis 
of either of the opinions, the Court concluded that: 
While there is much to be said in favor of both views expressed in Aro 
II, the “holding in Aro II has become a fixture in the law of contributory 
infringement under [section] 271(c),” 5 R. Moy, Walker on Patents § 
15:20, p. 15–131 (4th ed. 2009)—so much so that SEB has not asked us 
to overrule it . . . .  Nor has Congress seen fit to alter § 271(c)’s intent 
requirement in the nearly half a century since Aro II was decided.  In 
 
166. See Graham Cnty. Soil and Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 559 
U.S. 280, 298 (2010) (noting the “‘judicial duty to give faithful meaning to the language Congress 
adopted in the light of the evident legislative purpose in enacting the law in question’” (quoting 
United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 310 (1976))); Samuel P. Jordan, Irregular Panels, 60 
ALA. L. REV. 547, 577 n.124 (describing the appellate process as one in which “each judge is 
expected to read the briefs and cases necessary to participate meaningfully in the decisional 
process”); cf. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. v. Regal-Beloit Corp., 130 S. Ct. 2433, 2449 (2010) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court contorts the statute and our cases, misreads the statutory 
history, and ascribes to Congress a series of policy choices that Congress manifestly did not 
make.”); Robert A. Leflar, The Multi-Judge Decisional Process, 42 MD. L. REV. 722, 723 (1983) 
(“Knowledge that multiple judges check each other helps to sustain confidence and to protect 
individual judges from public criticism.”). 
167. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2067 (2011). 
168. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
169. See Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2067 (noting that the language in section 271(c) can be 
interpreted in various ways). 
170. Id. 
171. See supra Part II.B. and accompanying text (describing the decisions in Aro II). 
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light of the ‘special force’ of the doctrine of stare decisis with regard to 
questions of statutory interpretation . . . we proceed on the premise that 
§ 271(c) requires knowledge of the existence of the patent that is 
infringed.172 
The Court’s arguments here—although certainly not obfuscatory or 
wholly mistaken like those it made regarding the pre-1952 scienter 
standard for indirect infringement—are unconvincing.  First, if the Court 
had closely examined the holding in Aro II, its associated legislative 
history, and the pre-1952 case law—for the reasons presented earlier—it 
would have recognized that the majority’s reasoning was clearly without 
merit.  Second, whether a party asks the Court to overrule precedent is no 
bar on the Court’s authority to do so.173  Third, legislative inaction with 
respect to one of the Court’s decisions is a shaky ground upon which to 
infer acquiescence by Congress, except when “Congress considered and 
rejected the ‘precise issue’ presented before the Court.”174  Finally, 
although stare decisis has “special force” in the context of statutory 
interpretation, it has none where prior precedent is clearly incorrect.175  
For these reasons, the Court’s decision to reaffirm the holding of Aro II 
lacks merit. 
The Court’s failure to fully review the majority’s reasoning in Aro II 
led it to a sort of “bootstrapping” error in concluding that “the same 
 
172. Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2068 (first alteration in original). 
173. For instance, in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000), a number 
of dissenters would have overruled Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 936 (1976), despite the fact that the 
parties did not request as much.  See Nixon, 528 U.S. at 397 (noting that the parties did not request 
that Buckley be overruled); id. at 409 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (asserting that he would overrule 
Buckley); id. at 410 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating the same in an opinion joined by Justice 
Scalia); see also Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2421–32, 2429 (2013) (Thomas, 
J., concurring) (indicating that he would overrule Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), a 
precedent the parties did not request be overruled). 
174. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 750 (2006); see also Kimbrough v. United States, 
552 U.S. 85, 106 (2007) (“Ordinarily, we resist reading congressional intent into congressional 
inaction.”).  But cf. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283–84 (1972) (“We continue to be loath, [fifty] 
years after Federal Baseball and almost two decades after Toolson, to overturn those cases 
judicially when Congress, by its positive inaction, has allowed those decisions to stand for so long 
and, far beyond mere inference and implication, has clearly evinced a desire not to disapprove them 
legislatively.”). 
175. See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 521 (1995) (overruling a previous decision that 
“had been proved manifestly erroneous”); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828–30 (1991) 
(noting that the overruled cases had been “decided by the narrowest of margins, over spirited 
dissents challenging [their] basic underpinnings,” and had “defied consistent application by the 
lower courts”); id. at 827 (“[W]hen governing decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned, ‘this 
Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent.’” (quoting Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 
665 (1944))); Smith, 321 U.S. at 66 (“[W]hen convinced of former error, this Court has never felt 
constrained to follow precedent.”); see also Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405 
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“Stare decisis is not . . . [a] universal, inexorable command.”).  
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knowledge is needed for induced infringement under § 271(b)” as under 
section 271(c).176  The Court rightfully acknowledged that “the two 
provisions have a common origin in the pre-1952 understanding of 
contributory infringement, and the language of the two provisions creates 
the same difficult interpretive choice.”177  Yet, without any further 
reasoning, it concluded that “[i]t would thus be strange to hold that 
knowledge of the relevant patent is needed under § 271(c) but not under 
§ 271(b).  Accordingly, we now hold that induced infringement under § 
271(b) requires knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent 
infringement.”178 
Like its earlier reasoning, however, such a conclusion does not follow 
from the premises relied upon by the Court.  Although both provisions 
are ambiguous, as discussed in Part II, there is a critical difference 
between sections 271(b) and 271(c) that the Court in Global-Tech failed 
to recognize.  Specifically, the majority in Aro II premised its 
acknowledged diversion from the common law rule on the specific 
relationship between the words “knowing” and “infringement” in the 
following phrase in section 271(c): “knowing the same to be especially 
made or especially adapted for use in an infringement.”179  In particular, 
the majority found that given the modification of “infringement” by 
“knowing,” the clause raised a question of whether Congress intended to 
deviate from the pre-1952 rule by imposing a knowledge-of-the-patent 
requirement.180 
More particularly, the issue in Aro II arose solely because of the 
peculiar, narrow wording of section 271(c), which reflected a 
compromise in response to congressional testimony regarding the 
appropriate scienter standard for that section.181  Five Justices relied on 
that testimony and a related statutory amendment to find that Congress 
deviated from historical precedent, while four Justices disagreed, arguing 
that Congress codified that precedent.182  No such peculiar wording 
appears in section 271(b), which states: “Whoever actively induces 
 
176. Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2068. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. 
179. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1964).  
180. See supra notes 87–91 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Black’s reasoning in 
Aro II). 
181. See Aro II, 377 U.S. 476, 487–88 (1964); see also id. at 525–28 (Black, J., dissenting from 
the judgment) (describing the history of the statute in the House Committee). 
182. See id. at 487–88 (majority opinion on the judgment but dissenting on the scienter issue); 
id. at 525–28 (Black, J., dissenting from the judgment but commanding a majority on the scienter 
issue). 
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infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.”183  Thus, unlike 
section 271(c), there is no indication in the language of section 271(b) 
whatsoever that Congress intended to deviate from the traditional scienter 
standard.  As such, contrary to the Supreme Court’s conclusion in Global-
Tech, its holding in Aro II does not require imposing a knowledge-of-the-
patent requirement on section 271(b).184 
To be certain, scholars have made two other arguments that Aro II 
should necessarily lead to a knowledge-of-the-patent requirement under 
section 271(b), which are worth considering.  First, in his well-known 
patent law treatise, Donald Chisum suggests that because inducement 
required a greater level of scienter than contributory infringement prior 
to the 1952 Act—specifically, intent versus knowledge—“[t]he Aro II 
requirement that the defendant have some knowledge of the patent as well 
as the nature of his acts and their consequences would, therefore, seem to 
apply equally to [s]ection 271(b) and 271(c).”185  While Professor 
Chisum is correct as to the varying levels of scienter required under the 
pre-1952 standards, he overlooks the fact that neither mode of indirect 
infringement required knowledge of the patent prior to 1952.  Thus, the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the text of section 271(c) as requiring 
a deviation from pre-1952 precedent in Aro II should have no bearing on 
interpreting section 271(b), which contains no similar exempting 
language.186 
Second, some commentators argue that by eliminating the knowledge-
of-the-patent requirement under section 271(b), that section would 
effectively render meaningless the stricter requirements under section 
271(c), thereby recapturing activity that would otherwise escape liability 
under section 271(c).187  In other words, if one supplies a component of 
an infringing product, but does not know of the patent, that person would 
escape liability under section 271(c), but might be subject to it under 
section 271(b).188 
However, the premise that section 271(b) would somehow “swallow” 
section 271(c) is without basis.  As an initial matter, the statutory 
framework already contemplates that some activity that clearly avoids 
 
183. 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012).   
184. Cf. MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS § 15.20 (2010) (“Thus, one can argue that the proper 
outcome is to resist extending a precedent [Aro II] that is already questionable.”). 
185. CHISUM ON PATENTS § 17.04[2] (2010). 
186. See also MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS § 15.20 (2010) (addressing the same arguments 
made by Professor Chisum and finding that they “are not particularly persuasive”). 
187. See Holbrook, supra note 16, at 408 (“Using the broader intent standard risks swallowing 
section 271(c) altogether.”). 
188. See id. 
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liability for contributory infringement under section 271(c) may 
nonetheless constitute inducement of infringement under section 271(b).  
For instance, the sales of staple commodities can never give rise to 
liability under section 271(c), because such sales are expressly excluded 
by the terms of the statutory provision, but may lead to liability under 
section 271(b).189  In this regard, section 271(b) imposes a hurdle 
(specific intent) not required by section 271(c).190  As the Supreme Court 
recognized in Grokster, unlike section 271(c), mere “knowledge” of 
potential infringing uses does not suffice for a finding of inducement 
under section 271(b); rather, specific intent to encourage the acts 
constituting infringement is necessary.191  As such, even without a 
knowledge-of-the-patent requirement, section 271(b) imposes more 
stringent scienter requirements than section 271(c).192  Therefore, section 
271(b) would not render section 271(c) meaningless or superfluous.193 
 
189. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 935 n.10 (2005) 
(“Nor does the Patent Act’s exemption from liability for those who distribute a staple article of 
commerce, 35 U.S.C. § 271(c), extend to those who induce patent infringement, § 271(b).”). 
190. See Giles S. Rich, Infringement Under Section 271 of the Patent Act of 1952, 21 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 521, 538–39 (1953) (“A significant difference between paragraphs (b) and (c) is 
that proof of facts which comply with the provisions of the latter gives rise to liability without any 
further proof of intent or inducement . . . .”); see also Charles E. Miller, Some Views on the Law of 
Patent Infringement by Inducement, 53 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 86, 97–98 (1971). 
191. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936–37. 
192. Indeed, Holbrook describes the animus for his position as a policy view that the sale of 
goods capable of non-infringing uses should generally not lead to liability for indirect infringement, 
even when the accused infringer intended to encourage the acts of direct infringement.  See 
Holbrook, supra note 16, at 408 (“An intent to induce any acts that might result in an infringement 
would fall under section 271(b) even if there are considerable non-infringing uses.  Third-party 
liability should be the exception and not the rule.”).  Yet, as Judge Rich explained, section 271(b)’s 
higher scienter standard (namely, one of intent) was designed in part to “recapture” the sales of 
staple articles and goods with substantial non-infringing uses, which would otherwise fall outside 
the ambit of section 271(c).  See Rich, supra note 190, at 538–39.  Thus, Holbrook’s attempt to 
reinterpret the statute to fit the mold of his policy preferences should be rejected. 
193. One further potential counter-argument is that the sales of non-staple components with no 
substantial infringing uses would constitute inducement under section 271(b) whenever the seller 
had knowledge that such components were especially adapted for use in a patented combination, 
because such knowledge has been held to be sufficient to prove intent to encourage direct 
infringement.  See N.Y. Scaffolding Co. v. Whitney, 224 F. 452, 459 (8th Cir. 1915) (holding that 
intent may be inferred from knowledge that a component is especially adapted).  Thus, if Aro II 
remained good law, but was not applied to section 271(b), then activity that did not constitute 
infringement under section 271(c)—because the accused infringer had no knowledge of the patent-
at-issue—might constitute infringement under section 271(b) without any effectively heightened 
scienter standard under section 271(b)—precisely because knowledge that the component is 
“especially adapted” is a requirement of section 271(c).  In this limited set of cases, section 271(b) 
would then arguably subsume (i.e., “swallow”) section 271(c), imposing liability where none 
existed under section 271(c).  Yet, there is a problem with this reasoning, which is a perfect 
illustration of the Court’s missteps in Aro II and Global-Tech.  Granted, the Eighth Circuit stated 
in New York Scaffolding (which was quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in Grokster), 
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In summary, the Court’s analysis of Aro II in Global-Tech contains 
two major flaws and gaps.  First, the Court basically glossed over the 
reasoning of Aro II and essentially did nothing to investigate the 
soundness of the arguments made by the majority in that case.  Instead, 
the Court conclusorily stated that there “is much to be said in favor of 
both views expressed in Aro II.”  If the Court had undertaken any suitable 
modicum of scrutiny of the arguments of the majority in Aro II, it would 
have found them lacking. Second, the Court engaged in dubious 
“bootstrapping” arguments to find that the scienter requirements of 
section 271(c) are determinative of those under section 271(b).  Like its 
analysis of Aro II, if the Court had carefully formulated its arguments, it 
would have found otherwise. 
CONCLUSION 
As recounted above, the Supreme Court subverted the will of Congress 
to codify the historical precedent regarding whether knowledge of the 
patent-at-issue is required for a showing of indirect infringement.  
Contrary to the historical doctrine, the Court in Aro II and Global-Tech 
misread the case law and related legislative history to find that knowledge 
of the patent is required for indirect liability.  Indeed, in Global-Tech, it 
appears that the Court—likely via one of its law clerks and unbeknownst 
to the Justices—engaged in intentional obfuscation to reach its desired 
policy outcome. 
The Court’s derogation of its judicial obligations in these cases is 
particularly problematic given that it appears defendants in a large 
percentage of cases are unlikely to have knowledge of the patent-at-issue 
at the time of suit.  Of course, such a rule leads defendants to ignore 
 
“One who makes and sells articles which are only adapted to be used in a patented combination 
will be presumed to intend . . . that they shall be used in the combination of the patent.”  Id. at 459 
(cited with approval in Grokster, 545 U.S. at 933).  Yet, read properly, this sentence merely implies 
that intending to further the acts of direct infringement is required to meet the scienter required of 
indirect infringement.  Indeed, the New York Scaffolding opinion in the next sentence cites 
Thomson-Houston II, the opinion by then-Judge Taft holding that knowledge of the patent was not 
a necessary scienter requirement.  See id. at 459.  Thus, the very citation to cases such as New York 
Scaffolding rebuts the assumption of scholars like Holbrook that knowledge of the patent should 
be a requirement of section 271(c), and by implication, section 271(b).  To the extent that New York 
Scaffolding is misread so as to impose a knowledge-of-the-patent requirement—perhaps with 
reference to the term “patented combination” in its holding—then activity that fell outside of 
section 271(c) merely because the accused infringer had no knowledge of the patent would also fall 
outside the scope of section 271(b), because the inference of intent from knowledge in such cases 
would necessarily turn on the seller’s knowledge of the patent-at-issue—namely, that the seller 
knew its component would be used in a “patented combination.”  For these reasons, even in the 
context of especially adapted components, such arguments fail. 
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patents altogether.  Although the Court in Global-Tech adopted a “willful 
blindness” test, whereby purposeful ignorance could suffice for 
knowledge, the Court set the bar for meeting this test quite high.194  
Moreover, defendants can always immunize themselves against indirect 
infringement by securing a suitable “opinion of counsel” letter—which is 
typically straightforward to obtain for a sufficiently high fee paid to the 
lawyer drafting it—stating the patent-at-issue is not infringed, invalid, or 
unenforceable, thereby negating the requirement imposed by the Court 
that the accused infringer must know he or she is furthering an 
“infringing” act.195 
The upshot of these results is that indirect infringement will be 
exceedingly difficult to prove.  Specifically, the Court’s new rule will 
preclude pre-suit damages in the vast majority of cases in which the 
defendant had no knowledge of the patent (given the difficulty of 
showing “willful blindness”), as well as pre- and post-suit damages in 
nearly all cases in which the defendant has secured an opinion letter (at 
least until the deciding court makes a final ruling in the patentee’s 
favor).196  Although there are certainly coherent policy arguments that 
can be made in favor of such an approach—ones that are nonetheless 
unconvincing—it is not the Court’s province to displace the codification 
of precedent with its own policy-driven whims.197  It is even more 
problematic when the Court does so under the guise of wholly misguided 
legal arguments, ultimately resulting in patent law revisionism. 
 
 
194. See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2067–68 (2011).  Under 
the Court’s test, (1) the defendant must subjectively believe that there is a high probability that a 
fact exists and (2) the defendant must take deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact.  See id. 
195. See Rader, supra note 16, at 332 (“[O]btaining an opinion of counsel regarding inducement 
would . . . enabl[e] a would-be inducer to forge ahead with the harmful activity, by having it rubber-
stamped by an outside law firm.”). 
196. See Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 720 F.3d 1361, 1368–69 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
(holding that a “good faith” belief in the invalidity of the patent may negate the scienter required 
for inducing infringement). 
197. See, e.g., Kumar, supra note 17, at 730 (suggesting that the Court adopted a knowledge-
of-the-patent requirement to protect certain industries, like semiconductors, that would be 
“adversely affected” without it). 
